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Changes in the SC 2008 List of
Reportable Conditions
Libby Greene, MSN, APRN, BC
Director – Surveillance Section/Nurse Consultant
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
As authorized by South Carolina Statute #44-20-10 and
Regulation #61-20, the S.C. Department of Health and
Environmental Control (DHEC) updates the list of
Reportable Conditions in January of each year.  Revisions
to the list of reportable conditions are based on many
factors, including: 1) the need for DHEC to conduct
surveillance on new conditions or to increase surveillance
on certain existing conditions in order to protect the health
of the public and 2) changes in reporting requirements
from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).
The following revisions have been made to the 2008
List of Reportable Conditions:
New for 2008:
• Separate poster for laboratories that lists
reportable test results.
Additions to the List of Reportable Conditions:
• Novel Influenza A Virus Infection (Not H1 or H3):
added to Immediately Reportable Conditions.
• Staphylococcus aureus – methicillin resistant
(MRSA) (Bloodstream) Infection) (Lab only):
added to conditions reportable within seven
days.
• HIV testing, added:
? HIV CDR co receptor (L)
? HIV HLA-B5701 (L)
? HIV subtype, genotype, and phenotype (L)
Other Major Revisions to the List of Reportable
Conditions:
• Added “Paralytic and Nonparalytic” to
Poliomyelitis
• Changed “Campylobacter enteritis” to
“Campylobacteriosis”
• Moved Vibrio infections - all types, including
Vibrio cholerae O1 and O139 - to the list of
Electronic Disease Reporting
Claire Youngblood, MA
Data Manager
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
Lisa Still, BS
Training and Development Director
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
Electronic disease reporting continues to replace paper,
both nationally and in South Carolina.
The purpose of this transition is to
increase the quality of disease
reporting, while easing the burden for
providers and for state public health
department staff.  Two methods of
electronic disease reporting are
available to health care providers in
South Carolina, and both are faster,
more secure, and more complete than
Disease Reporting Cards and forms
sent through the mail.
Carolina’s Health Electronic
Surveillance System (CHESS) is a
Web-based system through which
providers can submit morbidity and
lab reports to DHEC via a secure
connection.  The 24 providers
currently using the system are no
longer required to submit 1129
Disease Report Cards for most
diseases.  Reports submitted in this
way reach public health staff much
more quickly than in the past and
contain much more complete
information for use in disease
investigations.  All health care
providers, regardless of the size of the
practice, are welcome to participate.
Another option available to a growing
number of laboratories is Electronic
Lab Reporting (ELR).  Electronic lab
reports are transmitted directly from a
laboratory’s database, with no additional data entry
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New List of Reportable Conditions for
Laboratories
Marya Barker, MPH
Epidemiologist
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
Julie Schlegel, MSP
Foodborne Epidemiologist
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
In 2008 S.C. DHEC will introduce a separate List of
Reportable Conditions for Laboratories. The purpose of
this list is to reduce confusion regarding disease reporting
responsibilities. The List of Reportable Conditions for
Laboratories will include the reportable conditions for
which there is a laboratory test. The list is conveniently
divided into categories of Bacterial, Viral, Parasitic, and
Other.  The few conditions omitted from the laboratory list
are those in which diagnosis is made based on clinical
data, e.g. hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) or conditions
which result in death, e.g. varicella or influenza deaths.
Outbreaks, unusual disease, and clusters of cases remain
as reportable situations on the laboratory list; however,
the terminology “foodborne outbreaks” was omitted since
the laboratorian is not likely to know the source of infection.
Many other states have already developed separate lists
for clinicians and labs.  The hope is that by targeting
different audiences with information based on their focus
area, reporting will be easier and faster than ever.
Required Laboratory Reporting of
Bloodstream Infections Caused by MRSA
Shirley Jankelevich, MD
Medical Epidemiologist
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
Dixie Roberts, RN, MPH
Nurse Consultant
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
Laboratory reporting of bloodstream infections caused by
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus has been
added to the S.C. DHEC list of reportable diseases for
2008.
Two mechanisms of reporting may be used: 1) hospitals
that use the Electronic Laboratory Reporting system should
submit the reports to DHEC through this route; 2) hospitals
that do not use the Electronic Laboratory Reporting system
should submit hard copy reports once a week.  Please
note that specific information for each blood culture isolate
is required and listed below.
The following codes for reporting must be used when
submitting electronically:
   (Continued on Page 3)
Urgently Reportable Conditions within 24
hours.
• Moved Dengue and Yellow Fever to the list of
Urgently Reportable Conditions within 24
hours.
Revisions to the Disease Reporting Card:
• Changed the order of the information.
• Revised the selections for race.
• Added “Diagnosis Date”.
• Deleted the “Hepatitis Diagnosis” section.
• Added a space to check if there is a rash when
reporting Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever and
Lyme Disease.
Revisions to the List of Reportable Conditions Poster:
• Revised the information under “How to Report”.
• Under “What to Report” added:  (1) “Date of
Diagnosis”, (2) “If female, pregnancy status”,
and (3) “Status:  In daycare or a food-handler.”
• In footnote #2, deleted “(a) screening test (e.g.,
EIA antibody)”
The above changes may be found:
• On the DHEC Web site at:
http://www.scdhec.gov/
http://www.scdhec.gov/health/
http://www.scdhec.gov/health/disease/index.htm
• On the 2008 DHEC Disease Reporting Card
(color is pink for 2008)
• On the 2008 List of Reportable Conditions poster.
Both the Disease Reporting Cards and the laminated
posters (sizes 8 by 11 inches and 12 by 24 inches) are
available from the DHEC regional public health
departments or from the DHEC Division of Acute Disease
Epidemiology in Columbia.
ELECTRONIC DISEASE REPORTING
 cont'd from Page 1)
required.  The availability of this option depends on the
software vendor for the laboratory.  Some laboratories are
already using ELRs, while others will need to wait until
their vendors’ software is able to transmit the data.
Providers interested in either or both of these electronic
reporting systems are encouraged to contact the Division
of Acute Disease Epidemiology at DHEC by calling the
CHESS Help Line at 1 (800) 917-2093.
(REQUIRED MRSA LABORATORY REPORTING  cont'd from Page 2)
   (Continued on Page 4)
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• SNOMED code: L-24852     Methicillin resistant
Staphylococcus aureus
• LOINC code:  600-7 MICROORGANISM
IDENTIFIED BLOOD CULTURE
In addition, the following information must be added to the
report that is submitted to DHEC:
1. Patient’s name
2. Date of birth
3. Patient ID number: SSN, if possible, or hospital
billing number
4. Sex
5. Date of collection of blood
6. Date of positive blood culture result
7. Whether specimen was drawn for a peripheral or
central line (if known)
8. Name of laboratory processing the blood culture
9. Name of hospital/medical office or healthcare
institution where the blood culture was drawn
10. Submit the antibiogram for the isolate
Outbreaks of Healthcare Associated  MRSA:
Outbreaks of MRSA in healthcare facilities should be
immediately reported to DHEC by the facility as defined on
the Annual List of Reportable Conditions.
Reportable Conditions:
Community associated MRSA: Outbreaks of MRSA skin
and soft tissue infections are associated with group
settings where close contact may occur, such as childcare,
athletic teams, prisons, and other residential facilities.
Outbreaks can occur in schools, but are usually associated
with an athletic team or other sharing of common
equipment.  Confirmed or suspected MRSA outbreaks
should be reported to DHEC.  Routine hygiene and
cleaning practices are available on the DHEC and Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) web sites and
are effective in preventing and controlling MRSA outbreaks.
Individual cases of MRSA skin and soft tissue infection
occur commonly in all settings in the community and are
not reportable.  It is possible for several individual cases
of MRSA skin and soft tissue infections to occur in the
same group setting, such as a school, without evidence of
close contact between the cases.  In that event, several
cases would not be considered an outbreak.
Syndromic Surveillance in South
Carolina
Dan Drociuk, MT (ASCP)
Director, Epidemiologic Response/Enhanced
Surveillance Section
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
Himal Dhotre, MPH
Syndromic Surveillance Epidemiologist
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
What is syndromic surveillance?
Syndromic surveillance is the systematic and ongoing
collection, collation, analysis, and interpretation, in real-
time, of health data needed to plan, implement, and
evaluate public health practice and emergency response.
The term “syndromic” applies to surveillance that uses
health-related data gathered prior to diagnosis. Analysis
of the data may signal sufficient probability of a case or an
outbreak to warrant further public health response. Several
data sources — both clinical and non-clinical —are used
for syndromic surveillance. Clinical data sources include
emergency department patient visits, laboratory testing
orders, 911 calls, and ambulance dispatch. Prescription
and over-the-counter drug sales and school or work
absenteeism are examples of non-clinical sources.  Unlike
traditional surveillance, syndromic surveillance does not
use actual diagnoses. Instead, symptoms (a patient’s chief
complaints) are used for clinical data, and presumed
symptoms are used for some non-clinical data (i.e. “sick”
or “not sick” for absentee data).  The purpose of syndromic
surveillance is to detect natural or man-made outbreaks
of public health significance earlier than afforded by
traditional surveillance. This allows public health agencies
to understand and respond more quickly to large-scale
outbreaks of public health significance. 1
South Carolina Aberration Alerting Network (SCAAN)
SCAAN is a collaborative network of syndromic systems
within South Carolina. Currently the network includes the
following data sources: South Carolina hospital
emergency department chief-complaint data, poison
control center call data, over-the-counter (OTC)
pharmaceutical sales surveillance, and the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention’s BioSense
biosurveillance system. This issue of Epi Notes will
focus on S.C. hospital emergency department
syndromic surveillance. Information on other segments
of the SCAAN system will be published in future issues
of Epi-Notes.
SC Hospital Emergency Department Syndromic
Surveillance
Data Acquisition
Syndromic surveillance begins with the acquisition of chief
complaint data from participating emergency departments.
Currently, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC)
(SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA cont'd from Page 3)
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sends daily feeds of their emergency department patient
chief complaints to DHEC. Greenville Hospital Systems
will soon begin sending DHEC the same information. The
data are gathered from existing patient information systems
and electronically transferred through a simple and secure
file interface to a central state server. Once the process for
generating and transferring the data file has been
established, the operation generally requires no personnel
time. DHEC receives each day’s information the following
morning. The agency classifies chief complaint data into
pre-determined syndromes.
1 Buehler JW, Berkelman RL, Hartley DM, Peters CJ. Emerg
Infect Dis 2003; 9(10):1197-1204)
Data Analyses & Interpretation
The Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) was
developed by the CDC to analyze real-time public health
surveillance data without needing background data. The
system uses a running baseline — the average number
of counts for a syndrome from a previous seven-day period.
The system compares current syndrome counts with the
previous week’s average. It then performs cumulative sum
(CUSUM) methods. For more information on EARS
analysis, go to the following link: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
surveillance/ears/ .
Below is a graphical output from the EARS software of the
“Respiratory” syndrome category using data from a S.C.
health care provider. During this one-month period,
aberrations from the running CUSUM indicated days
requiring further investigation. Patient chief complaints
used to develop the “Respiratory” syndrome category
included: “difficulty breathing”, “chest cold”, “pneumonia”,
“respiratory difficulty”, “gasping”, “pulmonary”, etc.
national surveillance), so this collaboration is paramount.
For example, if multiple aberrations (i.e. “flags”) were to
occur on multiple days, DHEC would contact the health
care facility providing the data and talk to the facility’s
infection control specialist. Together, they would make
casual inquiries or conduct a formal investigation to
determine if the flags indicate a real event or a false
positive. With additional experience and modifications, the
number of false-positive flags will decrease. Regardless,
the close working relationship between the health care
system and DHEC will always be essential to both
traditional and syndromic surveillance.
As with any surveillance system, there are limitations. It’s
always important to consider whether the data is
representative and complete, whether the system is
flexible, and other factors.
Hospital-based chief-complaint data analysis is another
useful tool in monitoring and responding to events of public
health significance.  EPI Notes will discuss this and non-
traditional sources of data in future issues.
DHEC will provide, free of charge, the software, support,
and assistance to implement transfer, and analyze
syndromic data. For more information on syndromic
surveillance in South Carolina and how health care
providers can participate, please contact Dan Drociuk
(drociukd@dhec.sc.gov) or Himal Dhotre
(dhotrehc@dhec.sc.gov).
DHEC Adds Human Illness with Avian or
Novel Influenza A as Reportable Condition
Lena Bretous, MD, MPH
SC Influenza Surveillance Coordinator/Medical
Epidemiologist
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
Infections and illnesses in humans with novel influenza A
have been added to the “Report Immediately with 24 Hours”
section of the S.C. 2008 List of Reportable Conditions.
Novel Influenza A viruses are characterized as different
from those currently circulating in humans (not H1 or H3
viruses).   These viruses include those that are subtyped
as nonhuman in origin and those that are unsubtypable
with standard methods and reagents in commercial or
state public health laboratories.
Goals of Novel Influenza A Surveillance:
The goals of Novel Influenza A surveillance include:  1)
rapidly identifying and reporting infections and illnesses
among humans with novel influenza A viruses to the S.C.
Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC),
2) ensuring prompt confirmation of human novel influenza
A virus infections; and 3) facilitating early initiation of
appropriate public health responses.
Syndromic surveillance occurs prior to diagnosis, so
interpretation of aberration requires a close working
relationship between the data provider and DHEC. It is
crucial to blend local “domain knowledge” (i.e. the health
care facility) with awareness of broader public health
issues (i.e. regional or statewide outbreaks, increased
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Paralytic poliomyelitis has been a reportable condition in
South Carolina for decades.  In 2008, non-paralytic
poliovirus infections will also become reportable. We briefly
review here the current status of global polio elimination
and explain the rationale for the new expanded surveillance
efforts.
Polio in the United States: Tens of thousands of people,
mostly children, were paralyzed by polio in the United
States as recently as the early 1950s. But cases of
domestically-acquired wild-virus paralytic poliomyelitis
have not been seen since 1979, when an importation of
the virus from the Netherlands led to an outbreak among
under-immunized Amish communities in the Midwest.1 The
elimination of polio in the United States was made possible
by high vaccine coverage. Two types of vaccines were used
— the Inactivated Polio Vaccine (IPV) or “Salk vaccine,”
licensed in 1955, and the Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV) or “Sabin
vaccine,” licensed in 1961.
Although wild-virus paralytic poliomyelitis disappeared
from the U.S. after 1979,  approximately 150 cases of a
rare and serious complication of OPV called Vaccine
Associated Paralytic Polio (VAPP) were reported between
1980 and 1999. With the aim of eliminating VAPP, the U.S.
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
recommended in 2000 that use of OPV be discontinued
and that IPV be used exclusively.2 Thus, OPV is no longer
used in this country, and no cases of domestically acquired
VAPP have been identified since 2000.
Polio in the World: In 1988 the World Health Assembly
passed a resolution calling for the global eradication of
polio.  If this goal can be achieved, polio will become only
the second infectious disease (after smallpox) to have
been eradicated.  Global polio eradication efforts have had
a number of ups and downs, but overall progress has
been astonishing. In 1988, an estimated 350,000 cases
were occurring annually. In 2006, fewer than 2,000 were
identified. This decline was seen despite intensive global
surveillance for cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP). AFP
cases serve as markers of possible paralytic polio and
trigger epidemiologic and virologic investigations.
Currently, polio is thought to be endemic, with ongoing
chains of transmission, in only four countries:  Afghanistan,
India, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Occasional cases are seen
in other countries that do not have sustained transmission,
but they can be traced back to importations from the four
polio-endemic countries cited above.3,4  Progress towards
eradication can be followed in near real-time on the Internet5
and is regularly reviewed in major medical journals.6,7
Currently, only polioviruses types 1 and 3 continue to
circulate.  Cases due to type 2 have not been seen in
several years, and experts thus believe that type 2 has
already been eradicated.
Challenge of Vaccine-Derived Polioviruses (VDPVs):  In
2000-2001, an unexpected obstacle to global eradication
was observed in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
Outbreaks of polio due to VDPVs — viruses that descend
from OPV strains — were documented.  Since then, similar
outbreaks have been seen in Madagascar, Indonesia,
China, and other countries where coverage with OPV has
been allowed to fall, leaving an appreciable cumulative
number of susceptibles in the population.8  Some
circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs) have lost attenuation
mutations and thus resemble wild-polio viruses in terms
of pathogenic potential and ability to circulate.  In addition,
long-term shedding of immunodeficiency-associated
VDPVs (iVDPVs) has been found in a small number of
people with B-cell immunodeficiency. These individuals
apparently lack the ability to produce antibodies that can
The addition of Avian or novel influenza A to the DHEC list
of conditions that require an immediate report within 24
hours does not address the goals and methods of
surveillance that will be needed during an influenza
pandemic. When the transmission of a novel strain of
influenza in the general population has become efficient
and sustained, this new pandemic influenza strain will no
longer be considered novel for the purposes of
surveillance.  Once widespread community transmission
has been established (e.g., during World Health
Organization Phase 6), methods other than individual case
reporting by clinicians will be used to track pandemic
influenza disease burden.   Based on experience with
seasonal influenza surveillance, notification of individual
influenza cases is unlikely to be either practical or the
best use of surveillance resources during this phase of a
pandemic.  Therefore, it is anticipated that other
approaches will be used to track the pandemic and guide
the public health response (e.g. reporting of aggregate
numbers of influenza-related hospitalizations, tracking of
rates of influenza-like illness, and tracking of pneumonia
and influenza mortality).
Methods for Surveillance of Novel Influenza A:
Clinicians should immediately report, within 24 hours,
human infections or illnesses related to novel influenza A
virus to their local public health department.  DHEC will
coordinate with the clinician methods of laboratory
testing and infection control guidance. State
epidemiologists, in conjunction with public health
laboratories, will report to the U.S. Center’s for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) all human infections with
influenza A viruses that are different from currently
circulating human influenza H1 and H3 viruses.
Polio Surveillance Update – Rationale for
Maintaining Vigilance Both for:
(i) Poliomyelitis, Paralytic and (ii)
Poliovirus Infection, Nonparalytic
Eric Brenner, MD
Medical Epidemiologist
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
(HUMAN ILLNESS WITH AVIAN OR NOVEL INFLUENZA A  cont'd from Page 3)
efficiently halt viral replication.  Thus, high levels of vaccine
coverage must be maintained not only to protect
populations from wild-type polio virus, but also against
possible neuro-virulent VDPVs.
VDPVs in the United States:  In 2005 a cluster of Amish
children shedding poliovirus type 1 was identified in
Minnesota.  The index patient was a 7 month-old child with
severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID). The child had
been hospitalized continuously with failure to thrive,
diarrhea, and recurrent infections.   Poliovirus was
unexpectedly identified in the child’s stools when they were
cultured for other enteroviruses.  An investigation
subsequently identified at least three other children in the
index child’s community who were also shedding
poliovirus.  The origin of the VDPV infections is not clear,
but it likely came from importation. None of these children
had been vaccinated against polio.  Fortunately, none had
paralytic disease.  Concerns raised by this outbreak
include its potential transmission to other communities
with low levels of vaccination and the risk of a polio outbreak
in the United States.9
Implications for Poliovirus Surveillance:  As long as either
wild poliovirus or VDPVs continue circulating anywhere in
the world, the United States faces the possibility of virus
importation.  Maintaining high-vaccine coverage thus
remains essential to forestall outbreaks that could occur
following importations, especially if large numbers of
susceptibles are allowed to accumulate. This is why South
Carolina and other states are reinforcing polio surveillance
by making even non-paralytic poliovirus infection
reportable.
Addendum – Other issues related to polio:  Practicing
physicians may also encounter several other clinical
entities that relate directly or indirectly to polio.  The first is
the so-called “Post-polio syndrome.” Originally described
in the 1970s Post-polio syndrome is characterized by
weakening of muscles that were affected by polio years
before —  and sometimes even weakening of muscles
seemingly not previously affected.  Since there are perhaps
900,000 or more aging polio survivors still living in the
United States it is not surprising that with the passage of
time such cases may be diagnosed with increasing
frequency.10,11 However, these cases present a personal
health problem for those now affected,  not a current
infectious public health problem.  Another clinical entity is
that of poliomyelitis-like syndromes due not to poliovirus
but to other viruses.  These have been reported, for
example, following infections with various non-polio
enteroviruses12-14  and (more recently) West Nile Virus.15-17
Given the global situation described above, it remains
essential to include polio in the differential diagnosis of
any case of acute flaccid paralysis, and to perform
appropriate diagnostic studies (e.g. stool cultures for
enterovirus). This is especially crucial in situations
involving recent foreign travel or contact with others who
have recently come from polio-endemic or affected
countries.  Confirmed cases of poliovirus infection of any
type should be reported to DHEC, and consultation about
suspect cases is advisable.
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Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
Laboratory Tests
Wayne Duffus, MD, PhD
Medical Director
Division of STD/HIV
A variety of HIV laboratory-testing advances have made it
possible to more effectively manage patients and predict
response to antiretroviral therapy (ART). For example, viral
load tests and measurements of CD4+ T-cell counts help
in monitoring the effectiveness of HIV-1 treatment. Now
other testing strategies are helping to optimize care of
HIV-infected patients and track the epidemic.
In recent years, resistance testing has become an
important tool in optimizing combination therapy for treating
HIV-infected individuals. The identification of resistance
mutations has allowed physicians to select the antiviral
agents that have maximum therapeutic benefit and
minimum toxic side effects. Antiretroviral drug resistance
can be analyzed using either genotypic or phenotypic
assays. The genotypic assays detect mutations that confer
drug resistance. Phenotypic assays are drug susceptibility
assays in which a fixed inoculum of HIV is cultured in the
presence of serial dilutions of the different ART to assess
viral replication. The determination of the presence of ART
drug resistance is now standard of care.
The human leukocyte antigen (HLA) allele, HLA-B*5701,
is associated with hypersensitivity reaction (HSR) to the
antiretroviral drug, abacavir. This reaction varies in its
severity and clinical manifestations. Symptoms include
rash, fever, gastrointestinal or respiratory symptoms,
arthralgia, myalgia, lethargy or malaise. This wide
spectrum of symptoms leads to frequent overestimation
of hypersensitivity reaction and to excessive drug
discontinuation. The distribution of the HLA-B*5701 allele
varies depending on ethnic origin, and determining its
presence before treatment with abacavir may be cost-
effective.
Based on genetic similarities, the numerous HIV virus
strains may be classified into types, groups and subtypes.
There are two types of HIV: HIV-1 and HIV-2. Both types are
transmitted by sexual contact, through blood, and from
mother to child, and they appear to cause clinically
indistinguishable AIDS. However, it seems that HIV-2 is
less easily transmitted, and the period between initial
infection and illness is longer in the case of HIV-2. Not all
of the drugs used to treat HIV-1 infection are as effective
against HIV-2. In particular, HIV-2 has a natural resistance
to nonnucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI)
antiretroviral drugs. Therefore, NNRTI therapy is not
recommended. The strains of HIV-1 can be classified into
three groups: the “major” group M, the “outlier” group O,
and the “new” group N. More than 90 percent of HIV-1
infections belong to HIV-1 group M. Within group M there
are known to be at least nine genetically distinct subtypes
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(or clades) of HIV-1. These are subtypes A, B, C, D, F, G, H,
J, and K. The present ARTs were developed for use against
subtype B, and so theoretically might not be effective against
subtypes from other regions of the world. However, there
is no data at present to suggest that subtypes differ in
their sensitivity to antiretroviral therapy. However, some
subtypes may occasionally be more likely to develop
resistance to certain drugs. In some situations, the types
of mutations associated with resistance may vary. This is
an important subject for future research. Historically,
subtype B has been the most common subtype in Europe,
the Americas, Japan, and Australia. Although this remains
the case, other subtypes are becoming more frequent and
now account for at least 25 percent of new infections in
Europe. It has been observed that certain subtypes are
predominantly associated with specific modes of
transmission. In particular, subtype B is spread mostly by
homosexual contact and intravenous drug use (essentially
via blood), while subtype C tend to fuel heterosexual
epidemics (via a mucosal route). Altogether, determining
the various HIV types, groups and subtypes is very
important for epidemiologic and clinical reasons.
2008 SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL DISEASE REPORTING CARD 
Disease reporting is required by SC Code of Laws Section 44-29-10, Regulation 61-20, 44-1-110, and 44-1-140. See other side for list of reportable diseases. 
Federal HIPAA legislation allows disclosure of protected health information, without consent of the individual, to public health authorities for the purpose of preventing or controlling disease.  (45 CFR §164.512) 
Patient Name 
 
Date of Birth 
 
Last First Middle Month / Day /Year 
Patient Phone Numbers Race 
 Asian  Black  White 
 Am Ind  Pac Isl  Unk 
Ethnicity   
 Hispanic or Latino 
 Not Hispanic or Latino 
Sex 
 Male     Female 
 Not Stated 
Patient Address / City / ZIP Code 
 
County  Patient ID or SSN If Female, Pregnant?
 Yes   No 
Disease (Include stage, if appropriate) 
 
 
Date of Diagnosis  
Symptoms                                                Date of Symptom Onset: ________ 
 
 
If Lyme or RMSF, Rash?    Yes  No 
For STD Reporting 
Treated:   Yes     No 
Treatment Date:  _________ 
Rx: ____________________  
Patient Status 
 In Childcare 
 Food Handler 
Laboratory Results 
 
 
Test 
Date  
 Specimen 
Site  
 
Hepatitis                   
Jaundice   Yes  
 No 
AST:   
ALT:   
Date:   
Hepatitis A Results 
Hepatitis A antibody (Acute IgM anti-HAV)  Pos  Neg  Unk 
Hepatitis C Results 
Hepatitis C – EIA........  Pos  Neg  Unk s/co ratio:  
Hepatitis C – RIBA......  Pos  Neg  Unk 
Hepatitis C – PCR......  Pos  Neg  Unk 
Hepatitis C – Viral Load    
Hepatitis B Results 
   Pos Neg Unk 
Hepatitis B surface Antigen (HBsAg)...............    
Hepatitis B core Antibody IgM (HBcAb-IgM)....    
Hepatitis B core Antibody Total (HBcAb).........    
Hepatitis B surface Antibody (HBsAb).............    
Hepatitis B e Antigen (HBeAg).........................    
Responsible Physician & Phone # 
 
Reporting Lab/Facility, Person, & Phone # Date Reported to Health Dept. 
For daytime & after-hours phone numbers: www.scdhec.gov/health/disease/docs/reportable_conditions.pdf 
For after-hours reporting of immediately reportable conditions, call state answering service: 1-888-847-0902 
For more information, call the DHEC Bureau of Disease Control in Columbia: 803-898-0861 (M-F 9-5) 
DHEC 1129 (01/2008)     DHEC Use Only: County Review Date        State Review Date          C    P    S    N 
 Send More Cards To: 
 (Address) 
Mail or Call Reports To: 
 
 
 
Reporting required by attending physician/designee and laboratory except where lab only (L) reporting is indicated. 
Report IMMEDIATELY By Phone Urgently Reportable Within 24 Hours By Phone 
 Any outbreak or unusual 
disease or cluster of cases   
 Any potential  biological (to 
include toxins such as ricin), 
chemical, or terrorist event (1) 
 Animal (mammal) bites 
 Anthrax (7) 
 Botulism 
 Foodborne outbreak – unusual 
cluster 
 Haemophilus influenzae type b, invasive 
disease (4) (7) 
 Influenza A – Avian or Novel (Not H1 or H3) 
 Measles (Rubeola) 
 Meningococcal disease  (4) (7) (9) 
 Plague (7) 
 Poliomyelitis, Paralytic and Nonparalytic 
 SARS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome   
 Smallpox 
 Viral Hemorrhagic Fever  
 Arboviral Neuroinvasive Disease (acute infection, including 
acute flaccid paralysis, atypical Guillain- Barré Syndrome): 
Eastern Equine Encephalitis (EEE), LaCrosse (LAC), St. 
Louis Encephalitis (SLE), West Nile Virus (WNV) (7) 
 Brucellosis (7) 
 Dengue 
 Diphtheria (7) 
 E-coli, shiga toxin-producing (STEC), including O157:H7 (7) 
 Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) (7) 
 Hantavirus 
 Hemolytic uremic syndrome  (HUS) 
 Hepatitis A, acute (IgM Ab+ only) 
 Hepatitis B, acute (HBcAb-IgM +) 
 Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei) (7) 
 Mumps 
 Pertussis 
  Q fever (Coxiella burnetti) 
 Rabies (human) 
 Rubella (includes congenital) 
 Staphylococcus aureus, vancomycin-resistant 
(VRSA/VISA) (7) 
 Syphilis, primary or secondary (lesion or rash)  
 Syphilis, congenital 
 Trichinosis 
 Tuberculosis (7) 
 Tularemia 
 Typhoid fever (Salmonella typhi) (7) 
 Typhus fever, epidemic (Richettsia prowazekii) 
 Vibrio infections - all types, including Vibrio 
cholerae O1 and O139 
 Yellow Fever 
Report Within 7 Days 
AIDS (2) 
Campylobacteriosis 
Chancroid 
Chlamydia trachomatis, genital site (L) 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (Age < 55 years) 
Cryptosporidiosis 
Cyclosporiasis 
Ehrlichiosis 
Giardiasis 
Gonorrhea  
Haemophilus influenzae, non-type b invasive disease (4)(7) 
Hepatitis B, chronic 
Hepatitis B Surface Antigen+ (HBsAg+) with each pregnancy 
Hepatitis C, D, E 
HIV-1 or HIV-2 infection (2) 
HIV CD4 co receptor (L) 
HIV CD4 T-lymphocyte count/percentage – all results (L) (2) 
HIV viral load – all results (L) (2) 
HIV HLA-B5701 (L) 
HIV subtype, genotype, and phenotype (L) 
Influenza, positive rapid flu test (report # of positive results) 
Influenza, positive virus culture isolates (L) 
Influenza, pediatric deaths – age ? 17 years 
Lead poisoning (5) 
Lead tests, all (6) (L, includes office tests) 
 Legionellosis 
 Leprosy (Hansen’s Disease) 
 Leptospirosis 
 Listeriosis (7) 
 Lyme disease  
 Lymphogranuloma venereum 
 Malaria 
 Meningitis, aseptic (8) 
 Pesticide poisoning 
 Psittacosis 
 Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever (RMSF) 
 Salmonellosis (7) 
 Shigellosis (7) 
Staphylococcus aureus - Methicillin Resistant (MRSA) 
Bloodstream infections (L) 
Streptococcus group A, invasive disease (4) 
Streptococcus group B, age < 90 days 
Streptococcus pneumoniae, invasive, (4) (include 
antibiotic resistance patterns) (3) 
Syphilis, latent or tertiary  
Syphilis, positive serologic test 
Tetanus 
Toxic Shock (specify staphylococcal or streptococcal) 
Varicella 
Varicella death 
Yersiniosis 
 Potential agent of Bioterrorism (L) Only labs are required to report.  For notes 1–10, see complete list of reportable diseases at: www.scdhec.gov/health/disease/docs/reportable_conditions.pdf. 
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Year-to-Date Summary of Selected Reportable Conditions - January 1, 2007 - November 30, 2007
Condition Confirmed Probable Total 
Animal Bite—PEP Recommended 346 * 346 
Aseptic meningitis 86 1 87 
Botulism, infant 1 0 1 
Brucellosis 2 0 2 
Campylobacteriosis 244 1 245 
Ciguatera fish poisoning 1 0 1 
Cryptosporidiosis 77 * 77 
Cyclosporiasis 1 * 1 
Dengue Fever 1 2 3 
Ehrlichiosis- human granulocytic 1 0 1 
Ehrlichiosis- human monocytic 1 2 3 
Ehrlichiosis- human- other&unspec 1 1 2 
Encephalitis- West Nile 2 0 2 
Enterohem. E.coli O157:H7 10 0 10 
Enterohem.E.coli shigatox+- ?serogrp 1 0 1 
Enterohem.E.coli- shigatox+- non-O157 0 0 0 
Giardiasis 108 0 108 
Group A Streptococcus- invasive 88 0 88 
Group B Streptococcus- invasive 34 0 34 
Haemophilus influenzae- invasive 45 0 45 
Hemolytic uremic synd- postdiarrheal 1 0 1 
Hepatitis A- acute 15 0 15 
Hepatitis B- acute 64 1 65 
Hepatitis B virus infection—Chronic 198 330 528 
Hepatitis B virus infection—Perinatal 0 0 0 
Hepatitis C- acute 0 0 0 
Hepatitis C Virus Infection- past or present 3606 447 4053 
Hepatitis Delta co- or super-infection- acute 0 0 0 
Hepatitis E- acute 1 0 1 
Influenza- human isolates 65 0 65 
Legionellosis 16 1 16 
Listeriosis 10 0 10 
Lyme disease 26 1 27 
Malaria 7 0 7 
Mumps 1 1 2 
Neisseria meningitidis- invasive (Mening. disease) 15 0 15 
Pertussis 50 13 63 
Rocky Mountain spotted fever 15 48 63 
S. aureus, vancomycin intermediate susc (VISA) 2 0 2 
Salmonellosis 1041 7 1048 
Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) 13 1 14 
Shigellosis 178 12 190 
Strep pneumoniae- invasive 303 0 303 
Streptococcal disease- invasive- other 6 1 7 
Tetanus 0 0 0 
Toxic-shock syndrome- staphylococcal 0 0 0 
Varicella (Chickenpox) 554 442 996 
Vibrio parahaemolyticus 1 0 1 
Vibrio spp.- non-toxigenic- other or unspecified 5 0 5 
Vibrio vulnificus infection 2 0 2 
West Nile Fever 1 1 2 
Yersiniosis 5 1 6 
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